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Introduction
In recent years there has been a growing interest in social and economic networks. Given the large evidence that network structure affects economic outcomes, a very important issue is to know which network structure will form. Indeed many authors have examined the evolution of the interaction structure in different economic contests. A very common characteristic of the networks is the presence of decay, that is the value an individual receives from another is a decreasing function of the number of links of the shorter path among them. Decay could be considered as the effect of generic frictions in the relations among agents, for example noise or delay, that are inevitable in the real world. But with the introduction of decay the network models become very complicated and it is very difficult to provide a complete description of all possible equilibria. In this paper, under the assumption that agents do mistakes, we show a way to provide a full description of all stochastically stable equilibria without the need to know all possible equilibria when agents do not make errors.
We consider the two-way flow model with decay described in Bala and Goyal [1] . It considers a setting in which each individual is a source of benefits, agents unilaterally 1 form (costly) links to access those benefits and in a link the benefits flow in both directions (two-way flow) without distinction of who supports the link cost. Thus individual links generate externalities whose value depends on the associated level of decay. This model does not provide a complete description of all possible equilibria for a large range of the model's parameters and does not provide any result regarding the dynamic process. The contribution of our paper is that, even though we are not able to describe completely all equilibria system converges, we can provide a full description of a special subset of them: all stochastically stable equilibria in networks with a sufficiently large number of agents. To do this we need a little change in the model's assumptions: in the strategy revision process we allow only nonsimultaneous revisions. With this modification the model becomes more manageable remaining almost identical to that described in Bala and Goyal [1] . Of course, all strict Nash equilibria are the same in both models. To single out stochastically stable equilibria, we have to assume that agents are making mistakes in their decision process; then we study the limit of the invariant distribution as the probability of mistakes goes to zero. The result is a full characterization of equilibria for all possible values of parameters; the equilibrium network architectures are very simple for a sufficiently large number of agents:
complete, star or empty network according to link cost.
Another paper that studies the network formation in presence of decay is that of Watts [21] . It considers the dynamics of network formation in the case of the connection model of Jackson and Wolinski [14] and shows that the resulting network structures are path-dependent. However, their approach differs significantly from ours because they restrict attention to models where, to form links, the consensus of both implied players is necessary 2 . Other papers related to network formation are those of Jackson and Watts [12] and Goyal and Vega Redondo [9] . Jackson and Watts study the network formation in a setting whe re players can form and sever links to play a coordination game and, occasionally, make mistakes; then stochastic stability is used to identify the limiting networks. Goyal and Vega Redondo study a similar model with the difference that links are one-sided. They 2 The link cost is supported by both implied players 4 consider both cases where the benefit derives only from directly linked players, and those where the benefit derives from directly and indirectly linked players. 3 The paper is organized in the following way: In section 2 we describe the model. Section 3 contains the main result. Section 4 discuss the possibility of generalizing the result in different contests. Section 5 concludes the discussion and provides possible directions for further research.
The Model
Let { } we denote the set of all paths between agents i and j.
In g the distance between agents i and j, denoted by ( ) ,; dijg , is defined as the number of links of the shorter path in ij The links are costly: every agent pays a cost k0 > for each link she supports. In our model, as in Bala and Goyal [1] or Goyal and Vega Redondo [9] , link formation is one-sided and non-cooperative: the formation of a link requires only the consensus of the supporting player.
In our model decay is exogenous. Let δ be the share of information that a player receives from another directly linked player. 4 The shorter path is that with the lower number of direct links and if a path between i and j does not exists we assume ( ) 
Results
In this section we describe the equilibria of the model and show the proofs. These results are strictly related to those in section 5 in Bala and Goyal [1] . In proposition 5.3, these authors give a complete description of strict Nash equilibria only for link cost of 2 k δδ <− . But for different link costs, a multiplicity of network architectures can exist that can be strict Nash equilibria and that could be, given the initial conditions, equlibrium states the system will converge to. Bala and Goyal give a complete description of strict Nash and prove the convergence to strict Nash equilibria in all parameter regions only for 4 n = . But for a general value of n they only show how, from every initial configuration, the dynamic process converges to we are able to provide a complete description of a special subset of equilibria using the concept of stochastic stability. But the model remains sufficiently complex to require a further simplification to carry on the analysis: in each period we only permit one agent to revise the strategy. The interpretation is that strategy revisions are governed by a Poisson process; in other words there exist sufficiently small intervals of time in which only one revision can take place. This modification in the revision process permits us to rule out the possibility of simultaneous revisions producing a simpler dynamic analysis and it does not change the static results described in Bala and Goyal [1] . Indeed the strict Nash equilibria are identical in the two models. The following theorem describes all stochastically stable states.
Theorem 1:
Let 01 δ <<.
I) If
To prove this theorem we use the notion of a recurrent set in the sense of Definition 7.4 in Samuelson [19] : a recurrent set X is a collection of absorbing set with the following two properties: a) it is impossible, for a single mutation, followed by unperturbed dynamic, to lead the system in an absorbing set not belonging to X; b) given two absorbing sets s' and s" in X,
we can find a sequence of absorbing sets in X, 
is possible to move from s k-1 to s k by a transition that includes a single mutation followed by unperturbed dynamics (minimality condition). In the following we denote this kind of sequence as path of one step mutations. Finally we use the result of proposition 7.7 in
Samuelson [19] : if a state is stochastically stable, then it is contained in a recurrent set and all states in the same recurrent set are stochastically stable.
In the proof we show that only one recurrent set exists for each interval of link cost. In part I, given that the unperturbed dynamic always leads the system in a 
The proof is in the appendix.
The proof moves in three steps. In the first we show that recurrent sets without a cs gG ∈ cannot exist. To prove this statement the result in lemma 1 is sufficient: assume a recurrent set that does not contain a cs gG ∈ ; a single mutation, followed by an unperturbed dynamic, is sufficient to move the system in a cs gG ∈ . This fact violates the property a for a recurrent set.
In the second step we show that all s gG ∈ are contained in the same recurrent set. To show this statement the result in lemma 2, satisfying property b for a recurrent set, is sufficient: assume that s G is split into two or more subsets and that each subset is contained in a separate recurrent set.
The result stated in lemma 2 is in contradiction with property a of the recurrent set. Hence these two results together tell us that only one recurrent set containing s G exists. In the third step we show that, for values of n 13 sufficiently large, the unique recurrent set contains only s G . To prove this the result stated in lemma 3 is sufficient. The rest of the proof derives from the result of proposition 7.7 in Samuelson [19] .
Proof of part III of Theorem 1 ( k δ > ) uses similar arguments. We need the following three lemma. property a for a recurrent set: a single mutation followed by an unperturbed dynamic is not enough to move the system in a network
We note that starting from e g this is verified in lemma 5 and, starting from any ps gG ∈ , it is verified in lemma 6. The rest of the proof derives from the result of proposition 7.7 in Samuelson [19] . QED
Discussion of the results
The key points that permit the results stated in theorem 1 are the setting of the revision process and the link-cost structure.
A change in the revision process affects the number of the perturbations that are necessary to pass from one state to another and consequently the small values of n is that lemma 3 is no more true in the sense that, starting from a star, a single mutation can induce the system to move to a different architecture 12 . Then the unique recurrent set (therefore the set of stochasticallly stable networks) can contain not only star networks but different network architectures too.
Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed the formation of social networks characterized by an exogenous decay such as that described in Bala and
Goyal [1] . Using the concept of stochastic stability, we can produce a reduction in the number of possible equilibrium network architectures in a large range of link costs. Indeed, these authors for intermediate link costs, using dynamic selection, do not provide a full characterization of equilibria.
Instead, using our refinement, we find very simple equilibrium networks for G . Figure 1 shows two examples. Note that when k δ > all strategies that are best response have to produce a connected network.
Consider any s gG ∈ with n agents. We can distinguish 2 kinds of agents: the central agent, denoted by c, and the peripheral agents, named p-agents. Suppose a mutation of c. She may sever some supported link and/or form new links; the resulting network may be: i) a connected but no essential characterized by #0 m = . Therefore we prove that, when the system is characterized by any
, it converges in a s gG ∈ with probability 1. Therefore the unperturbed dynamics brings the system eeither in a network 2 qls g (if link cm is severed) or in networks qls gG ∈ characterized by less and less # cm . In this second case the system converges in a network qls gG ∈ where at least a one condition among (1.1) and (1.2) ; note the right side is the number of agents in the set m N after the revision of c and it is the same as right side of (1.1) and (1.2). For agent m we can use similar arguments. iiNg ∈∈= is to continue to support the link with m. We note that right side of (1.4) and (1.5) is smaller than right side of (1.1) and (1.2) . Therefore may happen that (1.1) and (1.2) are not satisfied while (1.4) and (1.5) with #0 m = .
When conditions (1.4) and (1.5) are true, the best-response of all agents /, iNcm ∈ is to have direct links with c and m. Then, in the revision process, #c and #m are decreasing. We have to distinguish two sub-cases: when It is possible to demonstrate that, from this network structure, the system goes in a star network with probability 1 in a finite time Using similar arguments we can treat cases where are true conditions (1.1) and (1.5) as well as cases where (1.2) and (1.4) are satisfied to show the convergence in a state where only one condition remains true. QED.
Proof of lemma 4
Consider any gG ∈ and suppose a mutation in which an agent m forms links with all others. When other agents have the chance to revise, they delete their links; then the network becomes a cs g . In this state when agent m has the chance to revise, she severs all links because k δ > . Consequently, the state will be a e g . QED.
Proof of lemma 5
Note that the best-response of an agent supporting links with agents that are not linked with any other, is to sever such links. Consider a e g with n agents and suppose a mutation in which an agent i switchs to a strategy where she forms x ( 01 xn <<−) links. All no-connected agents have as best-response to form a link with i if:
(1.8) 
Proof of lemma 6
We use the same notation than in proof of lemma 3. Consider any ps gG ∈ and suppose a mutation of c. If c forms new links with any other the network will be a no essential star. In this state p-agents with the chance to revise will sever all no essential links and network will be a ms g . When c has the chance to revise, she will severs all supported link with peripheral agents. Therefore the system goes in a state with ps g and x no connected agents. If the number of agents connected in ps g (n-x) is sufficiently large the best-response of all agents is to be tied with c and the system converges in ps g ; otherwise the system converges in e g . Now we focus our attention on the mutation of a peripheral agent and denote it by m. After this mutation the resulting networks can be summarized in two cases: a) m supports new links with any (from 1 to n-2) p-agents; b) m supports new links with any (from 0 to n-2) p-agents and severs the link with c (See fig. 2 ).
Consider case a. The network is a qls g (See fig. 1 is to be tied with c or m depending on which one provides the larger payoff. Therefore the network will go in a ps g . 
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has the chance to revise, she severs all supported links. Therefore given that (1.11) is false the system goes in e g in any case.
Consider case b. The network is a 2 qls g (see fig. 1 
